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Till taught by pain, men know not water's worth. Byron
INTRODUCTION1
When all of these characteristics are put together – water
as a critical, non-substitutable resource, which flows and
fluctuates across time and space, for which legal
principles are vague and contradictory, and which is
becoming relatively more scarce and degraded as world
populations and standards of living grow – compelling
arguments for considering the security implications of
water resources management are found.

As human populations and economies grow
exponentially, the amount of freshwater in the world
remains roughly the same as it has been throughout
history. While the total quantity of water in the world is
immense, the vast majority is either saltwater (97.5
percent) or locked up in ice caps (1.75 percent). The
amount economically available for human use is only
0.007 percent of the total, or about 13,500 km3. This
comes out to only about 2300 m3 per person – a 37
percent drop since 1970 (United Nations 1997). Adding
complexity to this increasing scarcity is the fact that
almost half the globe’s land surface lies within
international watersheds (i.e., that land which
contributes to the world's 261 transboundary
waterways).

This paper investigates both the global water crisis – too
little clean freshwater for too many people, and global
water conflict – the political tensions that result.
WATER AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
An increasingly prevalent viewpoint about water and
security is best summed up by Ismail Serageldin, vicepresident of the World Bank: “The wars of the next
century will be about water” (quoted in the New York
Times 10 August 1995). The view that water will lead
to acute international conflict, one that is often tied to
causal
arguments
of
environmental
security,
unfortunately is gaining ground in both academic and
popular literature. Some authors assume a natural link
between water scarcity and acute conflict, suggesting
that “competition for limited . . . freshwater . . . leads to
severe political tensions and even to war” (Westing
1986). Others, often citing examples from the arid and
hostile Middle East, assume that “history is replete with
examples of violent conflict over water” (Butts 1997).
Still others, combining this “natural” connection
between water and conflict with assumed historic
evidence, forecast: “The renewable resource most likely
to stimulate interstate resource war is river water”
(Homer-Dixon 1994).

The scarcity of water in an arid and semi-arid
environment leads to intense political pressures, often
referred to as “water stress.” Furthermore, water not
only ignores political boundaries; it evades institutional
classification and eludes legal generalizations. The
1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses Commission is vague and
occasionally contradictory, and international agencies
have historically been limited in coordination or
strategy.
While water quantity has been the major issue of this
century, water quality has been neglected to the point of
catastrophe. The numbers are staggering:
• More than a billion people lack access to safe water
supplies;
• Almost three billion do not have access to adequate
sanitation;
• Five million people die each year from water-related
diseases or inadequate sanitation;
• Twenty percent of the world's irrigated lands are saltladen to the point of affecting production.

There are two major problems with the literature that
describes water both as a historic and, by extrapolation,
as a future cause of acute international conflict:
1. There is little historic evidence that water has ever
been the cause of international warfare; and

Water demands are increasing, groundwater levels are
dropping, surface-water supplies are increasingly
contaminated, and delivery and treatment infrastructures
are aging. The World Bank estimates that it would take
$600 billion to repair and improve the world's existing
water delivery systems (CAFRW 1997).

2. War over water seems neither strategically rational,
hydrographically effective, nor economically viable.

29

WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE OF A LINK
BETWEEN WATER AND INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT?

What is it about water that tends to induce cooperation
even among riparian nations that are hostile over other
issues?
The treaties negotiated over international
waterways offer some insight into this question. Each
treaty shows sometimes exquisite sensitivity to the unique
setting and needs of each basin, and many detail the shared
interests a common waterway will bring. Along larger
waterways, for instance, the better dam sites are usually
upstream at the headwaters where valley walls are steeper
and where, incidentally, the environmental impact of dams
is not as great. The prime agricultural land is generally
downstream, where the gradient drops off and alluvial
deposits enrich the soil. A dam in the headwaters, then,
not only provides hydropower and other benefits for the
upstream riparian nation, it also can be managed to evenly
control the flow for the benefit of downstream agriculture,
or to enhance water transportation for the benefit of both
riparian nations. Other examples of shared interests
abound: the development of a river that acts as a boundary
cannot take place without cooperation; farmers,
environmentalists, and recreational users all share an
interest in seeing a healthy stream-system; and all riparian
nations share an interest in high quality water.

One component of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute
Database Project2 at Oregon State University has been an
assessment of historic cases of international water
conflicts. In order to counter the prevailing anecdotal
approach, researchers associated with the project utilized
the most systematic collection of international conflict –
Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s (1997) International Crisis
Behavior data set – and supplemented their investigation
with available primary and secondary sources. This search
revealed a total of seven cases in which armies were
mobilized or shots were fired across international
boundaries – in every case, the dispute did not degrade into
warfare.3 According to our findings, with one exception
(now almost 4,500 years old),4 there has not been a war
fought over water.
It is, however, disingenuous to base a discussion about the
future solely on history. Part of the basis for predictions of
future “water wars,” after all, is that we are reaching
unprecedented demand on relatively decreasing clean water
supplies. But there are other arguments against the
possibility of “water wars.”5 They might include:

An Institutional Resiliency Argument
A Strategic Argument

Another factor adding to the political stability of
international watersheds is that once cooperative water
regimes are established, they turn out to be tremendously
resilient over time, even between otherwise hostile riparian
nations, and even as conflict is waged over other issues.
For example, the Mekong Committee has functioned since
1957, exchanging data throughout the Vietnam War.
Secret “picnic table” talks have been held between Israel
and Jordan, since the unsuccessful Johnston negotiations
of 1953-55, even as these riparian nations were in a legal
state of war until recently.
And, the Indus River
Commission not only survived through two wars between
India and Pakistan, but treaty-related payments continued
unabated throughout the hostilities.

If one were to launch a war over water, what would be the
goal? Presumably, the aggressor would have to be both
downstream and the regional hegemony – an upstream
riparian nation would have no cause to launch an attack
and a weaker nation would be foolhardy to do so. An
upstream riparian nation, then, would have to initiate an
action, which decreases either quantity or quality, knowing
that doing so will antagonize a stronger down-stream
neighbor.
The down-stream power would then have to decide
whether to launch an attack – if the project were a dam,
destroying it would result in a wall of water rushing back
on down-stream territory. Were it a quality-related project,
either industrial or waste treatment, destroying it would
probably result in even worse quality than before.
Furthermore, the hegemony would have to weigh not only
an invasion, but an occupation and depopulation of the
entire watershed in order to forestall any retribution –
otherwise, it would be simple to pollute the water source of
the invading power. It is unlikely that both countries
would be democracies, since the political scientists tell us
that democracies do not go to war against each other, and
the international community would have to refuse to
become involved (this, of course, is the least far-fetched
aspect of the scenario). All of this effort would be
expended for a resource that costs about one U.S. dollar
per cubic meter to create from seawater.

Any of these arguments, in and of itself, might not
convince one of the unlikelihood of “water wars.” The
combination of all of these factors, though – a historic lack
of evidence combined with strategic, interest-based, and
institutional irrationality of acute international hydroconflicts – should help convince us to think of water as a
vehicle for reducing tensions and encouraging cooperation
even between otherwise hostile co-riparian nations.
Undala Alam (1998) has aptly dubbed this concept of
water as a resource that transcends traditional thinking
about resource-related disputes, “water rationality.”

IF NOT “WATER WARS,” THEN WHAT ARE THE
SECURITY ISSUES?
The concept of “environmental security” is not restricted to
a presumed causal relationship between environmental

A Shared Interest Argument
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Ironically, many of those displaced in Bangladesh have
found refuge in India.

issues and international warfare. Much of the thinking on
the issue has evolved to incorporate a broader sense of
“human security” – a much more inclusive concept which
stresses the intricate set of relationships between
environment and society.6

So, while no “water wars” have occurred, there is ample
evidence that the lack of clean freshwater has led to
occasionally intense political instability, and that on a
small scale, acute violence can result. What we seem to be
finding, in fact, is that geographic scale and intensity of
conflict are inversely related.

Until now it is only the relationship between international
armed conflict and water resources as a scarce resource
that has been described. Internal disputes, such as those
between interests of states/provinces, were excluded, as
were those where water was a means, method, or victim of
warfare. Also excluded were disputes where water is
incidental to the main issue, such as those about fishing
rights, access to ports, transportation, or river boundaries.

Finally, there is the security issue of “simple” human
suffering. Again, five million people die each year from
water-related diseases or inadequate sanitation. More than
half the people in the world lack adequate sanitation.
Eighty percent of disease in the developing world is related
to water. With a crisis this clearly defined over a resource
this vital, the threats to security seem almost self-evident.

It is important to understand, therefore, that there is history
of water-related violence. It is a history of incidents that
are at the sub-national level, generally between tribes,
water-use sectors, or states/provinces.
Examples of
internal water conflicts, in fact, are quite prevalent. They
range from interstate violence and death along the Cauvery
River in India, to California farmers blowing up a pipeline
meant for Los Angeles, to much of the violent history in
the Americas between indigenous peoples and European
settlers. The desert state of Arizona in the United States
even commissioned a navy (made up of one ferryboat) and
sent its state militia to stop a dam and diversion on the
Colorado River in 1934.

HOW ARE WE EQUIPPED INSTITUTIONALLY TO
HANDLE WATER SECURITY?
Resolving the global water crisis, and ameliorating the
attendant political stresses, increasingly will involve
sophisticated mechanisms for cooperation. Current legal
and institutional capacities are limited, but strides are being
made slowly. Addressing both the water crisis and water
conflict, global institutions both foster good relations
among sovereign neighbors and improve capabilities for
water resources management.

While these “flashpoints” can and do occur at the subnational level, the more common security issue is both
more subtle and more pervasive. As water quality and/or
quantity degrades over time within a local setting, the
effect on the stability of a region can be unsettling. Since
the degradation generally occurs slowly over time, it is
difficult to say precisely where its impact begins and ends;
yet the effects can be profound. Take, for example, the
case of the Gaza Strip where, over the thirty years the
region was under Israeli occupation, water quality steadily
deteriorated, saltwater intrusion degraded local wells, and
water-related diseases took a rising toll on the population.
In 1987, the intifada, or Palestinian uprising, broke out in
the Gaza Strip, and quickly spread throughout the West
Bank. Was water quality the cause? It would be
disingenuous to identify such direct causality. Was it an
irritant which exacerbated an already tenuous situation?
Undoubtedly.

Legal Principles
Generalized legal principles for the management of
transboundary waters are currently defined by the
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in
1997. The Convention, which took 27 years to develop,
reflects the difficulty of marrying legal and hydrologic
intricacies: while the Convention provides many important
principles, including responsibility for cooperation and
joint management, it is also vague and occasionally
contradictory. The Convention also provides few practical
guidelines for water allocations – the heart of most water
conflict. Neither these principles, nor those of the
Convention's precursors – the 1966 Helsinki Rules or
subsequent draft articles by international legal bodies –
have been explicitly invoked in more than a handful of
water negotiations or treaties.

Moreover, one need look no further than relations between
India and Bangladesh to note that these internal
instabilities can be both caused and exacerbated by
international water disputes. At issue is a barrage that
India built at Farakka, which diverts a portion of the
Ganges flow away from its course into Bangladesh, and
towards Calcutta 100 miles to the south, in order to flush
silt away from that city's seaport. Adverse effects in
Bangladesh resulting from reduced upstream flow have
included degradation of both surface and groundwater,
impeded navigation, increased salinity, degraded fisheries,
and danger to water supplies and public health. Migration
out of affected areas has further compounded the problem.

Furthermore, international law only concerns itself with the
rights and responsibilities between nations. Some political
entities that might claim water rights, therefore, would not
be represented, such as the Palestinians along the Jordan River
or Kurds along the Euphrates River. In addition, cases are
heard by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) only with the
consent of the parties involved; and no practical enforcement
mechanism exists to back up the Court’s findings, except in
the most extreme cases. A nation with pressing national
interests can, therefore, disclaim entirely the court’s
jurisdiction or findings. Since its creation in 1945, the ICJ has
decided only a single case regarding international waters.
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Flood Control 13/145 (9%)
Industrial Uses 9/145 (6%)
Navigation 6/145 (4%)
Pollution 6/145 (4%)
Fishing 1/145 (<1%)

International Institutions
Just as the flow of water totally ignores political boundaries,
so too does its management strain the capabilities of
institutions. No global institution currently exists for the
management of transboundary water resources. Several UN
agencies, including UNEP, UNDP, UNESCO, WHO, FAO,
and UNIDO, incorporate water related issues in their charter,
as does the World Bank. All of these agencies recently
collaborated in production of the Comprehensive Assessment
of the Freshwater Resources of the World (CAFRW). Many
global water-related agencies have also recently cooperated in
formation of the Global Water Partnership that aims to
coordinate water policy worldwide. The World Water Council
was also established recently as a self-described “think tank”
for world water resources issues. However, none of these
agencies incorporate mechanisms for the resolution of
transboundary water resources disputes within their mandates.

Monitoring
Provided 78/145 (54%)
No/Not Available 67/145 (46%)
Conflict Resolution
Council 43/145 (30%)
Other Governmental Unit 9/145 (6%)
United Nations/Third Party 14/145 (10%)
None/Not Available 79/145 (54%)
Enforcement
Council 26/145 (18%)
Force 2/145 (1%)
Economic 1/145 (<1%)
None/Not Available 116/145 (80%)

Many of the most productive efforts at the international level
are brought about by strong personalities within agencies
and/or through ad hoc collaborations between agencies. The
1960 Indus Water Treaty owes much to David Black, thenpresident of the World Bank; the Mekong Committee was
formed due primarily to an alliance between UNECAFE and
the US Bureau of Reclamation; and the 1994 Danube River
Protection Convention involved leadership from UNDP, the
World Bank, and the Commission of European Communities.
Occasionally, initiative is offered through economic and
political alliances, as has been the case with the European
Union’s water quality guidelines, and the Southern African
Development Community’s protocol on Shared Watercourse
Systems.

Unequal Power Relationship
Yes 52/145 (36%)
No/Unclear 93/145 (64%)
Information Sharing
Yes 93/145 (64%)
No/Not Available 52/145 (36%)
Water Allocation
Equal Portions 15/145 (10%)
Complex but Clear 39/145 (27%)
Unclear 14/145 (10%)
None/Not Available 77/145 (53%)

International Water Treaties
In the absence of detailed water law, adequate institutions, or
warfare, the countries that incorporate the world's 261
international waterways have managed to muddle through.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization has identified
more than 3,600 treaties relating to international water
resources dating between AD 805 and 1984, the majority of
which deal with some aspect of navigation. Since 1814, states
have negotiated a smaller body of treaties that deal with nonnavigational issues of water management, flood control,
hydropower projects, or allocations for consumptive or nonconsumptive uses in international basins. The Transboundary
Freshwater Dispute Database project includes an online
collection of 145 of these treaties, which include only those
dating from 1870 and later which deal with water per se, and
exclude those that deal only with boundaries, navigation, or
fishing rights.

Non-Water Linkages
Money 44/145 (30%)
Land 6/145 (4%)
Political Concessions 2/145 (1%)
Other Linkages 10/145 (7%)
No Linkages 83/145 (57%)
Source: Hamner and Wolf (1998).

Despite their number and rich history, these 145 treaties
reveal that the legal management of transboundary rivers is
still in its conceptual infancy. More than half of these
treaties include no monitoring provisions whatsoever, and
perhaps as a consequence, two-thirds do not delineate
specific allocations and four-fifths have no enforcement
mechanism. Moreover, those treaties, which do allocate
specific quantities, allocate a fixed amount to all riparian
nations but one – that one nation must then accept the
balance of the river flow, regardless of fluctuations.
Finally, multilateral basins are, almost without exception,
governed by bilateral treaties, precluding the integrated
basin management long-advocated by water managers.

Table 1. Treaty Statistics Summary Sheet
Signatories
Bilateral 124 out of a total 145 treaties, or 86%
Multilateral 21/145 (14%)
Principal Focus
Water Supply 53/145 (37%)
Hydropower 57/145 (39%)
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and public policies, but they all fall under the same three
basic categories as for any resource shortage: increase
supply, decrease demand, or improve the quality.

WHAT TECHNICAL/POLICY OPTIONS ARE
AVAILABLE?
The solutions to this crisis are complex and expensive.
They range from agricultural to technological to economic

Table 1: Water management options to increase supply, decrease demand, or improve quality
UNILATERAL OPTIONS
DEMAND
•
•
•
•
•

Urban/industrial demand management.
Rationing.
Public awareness.
Allow price of water to reflect true costs.
Efficient agriculture, including drip irrigation, greenhouse technology, and genetic
engineering for drought and salinity resistance.

SUPPLY
•
•
•
•
•

Wastewater reclamation.
Increase catchment and storage (including artificial groundwater recharge).
Cloud seeding.
Desalination.
Fossil aquifer development.

QUALITY
•
•
•

Treat drinking water supplies at its most appropriate level.
Work towards universal sanitation.
Eradicate water-related disease through water treatment and/or vaccination programs.

COOPERATIVE OPTIONS
•
•
•
•

Shared information and technology.
International water markets to increase distributive efficiency (where appropriate).
Inter-basin water transfers.
Joint regional planning and coordination.

stored underground through artificial groundwater recharge,
can add to supplies just as effectively.
New Sources Through Technology. Projects like iceberg
towing and cloud-seeding, though appealing to the
imagination, do not seem to be the most likely direction for
future technology. The two more likely (although more
mundane) means to increase water supply for the future are
desalination and wastewater reclamation. High costs have
precluded both – particularly desalination for most uses,
although efforts are being made to lower these costs through

Some of the current issues include:
Increasing Supply
New Natural Sources. No new rivers are likely to be
discovered in the world, but more efficient management of
existing sources and greater catchment of floodwaters, perhaps
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3. More likely than international “flashpoints” is a gradual
decreasing of water quantity and/or quality, which over
time can affect the internal stability of a nation or region,
and act as an irritant between ethnic groups, water sectors,
or states/provinces. The resulting instability can spill into
the international arena.

multiple use plants (getting desalted water as a byproduct in a
plant designed primarily for energy generation), increased
energy efficiency in plant design, and by augmenting
conventional plant power with solar or other energy sources.
Decreasing Demand

4. The greatest human security threat of the global water
crisis comes about not from the threat of warfare, or even
from political instability, but rather from the simple fact
that millions of people lack access to sufficient quantities
of this critical resource at sufficient quality for their well
being.

Agricultural Sector. Agriculture is far and away the leading
consumer of water resources, taking about 70 percent of
withdrawals worldwide. Technological advances like dripirrigation and micro-sprinklers are 20-50 percent more
efficient than standard sprinklers and tremendously more so
than the open-ditch flood method. Computerized control
systems, working in conjunction with direct soil moisture
measurements can add even more precision to crop irrigation.
Other water savings have come through bioengineered crops
that exist on a minimal amount of freshwater, on brackish
water, or even on the direct application of saltwater.

WHAT TYPES OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
CAN ONE MAKE?
Given these lessons, what can the international community
do?

Economic Water Efficiency. Water costs worldwide are highly
subsidized, especially water earmarked for agriculture.
Economic theory argues that only when the price paid for a
commodity is a reasonable reflection of the true price can
market forces work for efficient distribution of the commodity.
Take away subsidies and allow the price to rise, it is argued,
and market incentives are created for both greater efficiency
on the farm and a natural shift of water resources from the
agricultural sector to industry, where contribution to GNP per
unit of water is often much higher. These arguments, though,
tread through quite sensitive territory, have serious
implications for equity, and often overlook other effects of
urbanization.

International Institutions:
Water dispute amelioration is as important, more effective,
and less costly than conflict resolution. Watershed
commissions should be developed for those basins that do
not have them, and strengthened for those that do.
Three traits of international waters – the fact that conflict is
invariably sub-acute, that dangerous flashpoints can be
averted when institutions are established early, and that
such institutions are tremendously resilient over time –
inform this recommendation. Early intervention is also
beneficial to the process of conflict resolution, helping to
shift the mode of dispute from costly, impasse oriented
dynamics to less costly, problem solving dynamics. In the
heat of some flashpoints, such as the Nile, the Indus, and
the Jordan, as armed conflict seemed imminent,
tremendous energy was spent just getting the parties to talk
to each other. In contrast, discussions in the Mekong
Committee, the multilateral working group in the Middle
East and on the Danube, have all moved beyond the causes
of immediate disputes on to actual, practical projects that
may be implemented in an integrative framework.

Improving Quality
The strategies for improving quality have long been known:
clean water both before and after it is used, and eradicate
water-related diseases. The problem has too often been a
“simple” lack of funds and/or coordination for this enormous
task. The near eradication of dracunculiasis (guinea worm) in
this decade provides a good example of a successful focused
effort, coordinated between UN agencies and national and
local governments, where attention was paid to all aspects of
the disease and its transmission, from surveys and education to
treatment and containment.7

WHAT ARE THE MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED
WHICH HAVE POLICY IMPLICATIONS?
Funding and Aid Agencies:
The most critical security lessons learned from the global
experience in water security are as follows:

Water-related aid needs to be coordinated and focused,
relating quality, quantity, groundwater, surfacewater, and
local socio-political settings in an integrated fashion.
Funding should be commensurate with the responsibility
these agencies have for alleviating the global water crisis.

1. Water that crosses international boundaries can exacerbate
relations between nations that share the basin. While the
tension is not likely to lead to warfare, early coordination
between riparian states can help ameliorate the issue
entirely.

Ameliorating the crux of water security – the crisis of
human suffering – often rests with these agencies which,
given the size of the crisis, are extraordinarily
underfunded. One can contrast the resources spent on
issues such as global change and arms control in efforts to
protect against potential loss of life in the future, while
millions die in the present due to a lack of access to clean

2. Once international institutions are in place, they are
tremendously resilient over time, even between otherwise
hostile riparians, and even as conflict is waged over other
issues.
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generally greater than those of public institutions, and their
strategic planning is generally unmatched. Historically,
private companies such as Bechtel and Lyonnaise des Eaux
have been involved primarily in large development
projects, while the smaller scale projects have been left to
aid agencies to develop. Recently, a shift in thinking has
taken place in some corporate board rooms. Bank of
America, for example, was not involved in the Californiawide process of water planning until recently, when its
president noticed that practically all of the bank’s
investments relied on a safe, stable supply of water. This
was true whether the investments were in micro-chip
manufacturing, mortgages, or the more traditional
agriculture. When the bank became involved in the “CalFed Plan,” bringing with it its lawyers, planning expertise,
and facilitators, not to mention its financial resources,
progress was made in several areas which had till then
been mired down in impasse.

fresh water. Agencies such as USAID, CIDA, and JICA
have the technical expertise and experience to help, yet are
hindered by political and budget constraints. Funding
agencies often are hamstrung by local politics. A powerful
argument might be made for the fact that water-related
disease costs the global economy US$125 billion per year,
while ameliorating them would “only” cost US$7-50
billion (Gleick, 1998). Projects such as USAID’s Project
Forward, which integrates water management with conflict
resolution training, offer models for the future.
Universities and Research Agencies:
Universities and research agencies can best contribute to
the alleviation of the water crisis in three major ways: 1)
acquire, analyze, and coordinate the primary data
necessary for good empirical work; 2) identify indicators
of future water disputes and/or insecurity in regions most
at risk; and 3) train tomorrow’s water managers in an
integrated fashion.

Civil Society:

The internet’s initial mandate is still one of the best: to
allow communication between researchers around the
world to exchange information and enhance collaboration.
The surfeit of primary data currently threatens an
information overload in the developed world, while the
most basic information can be lacking in the developing
world. University programs such as the Institute of Earth,
Oceans, and Space at the University of New Hampshire are
working to ferret out useful global hydrological data, while
encouraging greater collection and dissemination
capabilities where they are lacking. Data availability not
only allows for greater understanding of the physical world
but, by adding parameters from the socio-political realm,
indicators showing regions at risk in the future can be
identified. Such projects are taking place for human
security at the University of Victoria, and for indicators of
water dispute at Oregon State University.
Finally,
universities are slowly recognizing that water is, by its
nature, an exceptionally interdisciplinary resource and that
the attendant disputes can only be resolved through active
dialog among fields as diverse as science, law, economics,
religion, and ethics. It is difficult enough to find university
programs at the graduate level which adequately train
students in water from a truly interdisciplinary perspective,
allowing for exposure to both the science and policy of
water resources (there are maybe four such programs in the
entire United States) but there is no program which
explicitly adds the international component.

Inherent in our recognition that the most serious problems
of water security are those at the local level, is the
attendant recognition that civil society is among the best
suited to address local issues.
One recurrent pattern in water resources development and
management has been a series of projects or approaches
which are in opposition to local values or customs. These
projects can be as large as dams which displace hundreds
of thousands of people and wipe out sites of cultural and
religious heritage; as heedless as promoting water markets
among religious groups for whom the idea is sacrilege; or
as seemingly minor as cutting down a tree which is sacred
to a village djinn. In recent years, as a consequence, the
idea of including those affected by a project into the
decisionmaking process has taken hold. Moreover, some
aspects of civil society have both local roots and a global
reach. Rotary International, for example, was awarded the
1997 Crystal Drop Award, the most prestigious
institutional award of the International Water Resources
Association, for its coordinated efforts in water supply and
sanitation projects throughout the world.
CONCLUSIONS
The global water crisis has led to a large and growing
literature warning of future “water wars,” and pointing to
water not only as a cause of historic armed conflict, but as
the resource which will bring combatants to the battlefield
in the 21st century. The historic reality has been quite
different – we have not, and probably will not, go to war
over water. In modern times, only seven minor skirmishes
have been waged over international waters. Conversely,
over 3,600 treaties have been signed over different aspects
of international waters – 145 in this century on water qua
water – many showing tremendous elegance and creativity
for dealing with this critical resource. This is not to say
that armed conflict has not taken place over water, only
that such disputes generally are between tribes, water-use
sectors, or states/provinces. What we seem to be finding,

Private Industry:
Private industry has historically taken the lead in large
development projects. As the emphasis in world water
shifts to a smaller scale, and from a focus on supply to one
on demand management and improved quality, private
industry has much to offer.
Private industry has three traits that can be harnessed to
help ameliorate the world water crisis: their reach
transcends national boundaries, their resources are
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in fact, is that geographic scale and intensity of conflict are
inversely related.

Strategic Policy and Action. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.

While the patterns described in this paper suggest that the
more valuable lesson of international water is as a resource
whose characteristics tend to induce cooperation and incite
violence only in the exception, one should not lose sight of
the truly dire straits that have been brought about by the
global water crisis. The critical problems that need
addressing are neither of wars nor of politics, but rather of
“simply” getting an adequate supply of clean freshwater to
the people of the world.

Wolf, A. 1999. “Water Wars” and Water Reality: Conflict
and Cooperation along International Waterways. In
S.C. Lonergan (Ed.). Environmental Change,
Adaptation and Human Security (forthcoming).
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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development, and international security. Underlying all of
the Institute's work is the recognition that the pressing
problems of environmental degradation, regional and
global poverty, and political tension and conflict are
fundamentally interrelated, and that long-term solutions
require an interdisciplinary perspective.
<http://www.pacinst.org/>

5

These arguments are described in more detail in A. Wolf,
1999. “Water Wars” and Water Reality: Conflict and
Cooperation along International Waterways.
6

For a more detailed discussion of these issues see, S. C.
Lonergan (1997) Global Environmental Change and Human
Security. In Changes 5. Ottawa: Canadian Global Change
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The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database
The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, an
ongoing research effort at Oregon State University,
currently includes a computer compilation of 150 waterrelated treaties and 39 US inter-state compacts, catalogued
by basin, countries or states involved, date signed, treaty
topic, allocations measure, conflict resolution mechanisms,
and non-water linkages. The Database also includes a
digitized inventory of international watersheds, negotiating
notes and background material on 14 case-studies of
conflict resolution, news files on cases of acute waterrelated conflict, and assessments of indigenous/traditional
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Gleick (1998) provides more detail on this and other water
quality examples.
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ENDNOTES
1

A shorter version of this paper appeared as, Wolf, A.
“Water and Human Security.” AVISO: An Information
Bulletin on Global Environmental Change and Human
Security. Bulletin #3, June 1999.
2

For more information on the Database Project, see A. Wolf.
“The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Project.”
Water International. December 1999 (forthcoming).
3

For a list of conflicts see A. Wolf, 1999. “Water Wars”
and Water Reality: Conflict and Cooperation along
International Waterways.
In S.L. Lonergan (Ed.),
Environmental Change, Adaptation and Human Security,
(forthcoming). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

4

The exception is the earliest documented interstate conflict
known, a dispute between the Sumerian city-states of Lagash
and Umma over the right to exploit boundary channels along
the Tigris in 2,500 BCE (Cooper 1983). In other words, the
last and only “water war” was 4,500 years ago.
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